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On Self-Selection in PES Schemes 
RESULTS OF PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS: NOT FOR QUOTATION 
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates participation by farmers in the UK Environmental Stewardship Schemes and 
how decisions to join the scheme are related to land productivity levels on the one hand and 
ecological conservation on the other. In particular the paper will explore the extent to which the self 
selection of farmers onto the scheme influences likely scheme performance.  The first part of the 
paper analyses a theoretical model for the provision of ecological services where an uninformed 
government agency offers to contracts to well-informed farmers.  The results of this analysis indicate 
the extent to which self selection by farmers can impair the efficiency of PES schemes and point to 
specific strategies that might be used by a government agency to mitigate these effects.  These 
results are used to motivate the empirical analysis of a sample of participants in the UK’s 
Environmental Stewardship Schemes (ESS). We use a comprehensive dataset for more than 10,000 
ESS agreements over different years to estimate different regression models. The results of this 
preliminary analysis can inform policy makers on a more adequate design of conservation schemes 
with respect to positive and/or negative effects of self-selection. 
Keywords: Payment for Environmental Services; Self-Selection in PES Schemes; UK Environmental 
Stewardship Schemes; Beneficial Selection. 
 
1.  Introduction 
There is now a substantial literature on the design, efficiency and effectiveness of schemes that 
provide payments to farmers for the provision of ecosystem services on their land. These schemes 
(often referred to as PES schemes) typically involve the voluntary participation by farmers who can 
decide how much of their land to enter into the scheme and payment levels are generally set to 
reflect the opportunity costs of providing specific services on this land.  An important issue here is 
the problem of asymmetric information where the farmers receiving the payments have better 
information than the agency providing the payments about both the level of services that can be 
provided on their land and the opportunity costs of providing these services.   
This problem has been highlighted by a large number of studies and there is widespread 
belief that the outcome in many circumstances is characterised by impaired scheme efficiency.  It 
has been examined from a contract design perspective by Ferraro (2008), Wu and Babcock (1996), 
Moxey et al. (1999) (and others), and from a more specific spatial targeting perspective by Canton et 
al. (2009) and Khanna and Ando (2009).  These studies highlight the problem of information 
asymmetry and suggest a variety of strategies the agency might adopt to ameliorate the problem.   
Empirical work in this area includes that by Quilerou and Fraser (2010) for the UK, and studies by 3 
 
Claassen et al. (2008), Connor et al. (2008), Waetzold and Drechsler (2005), and Strijker et al (2000), 
for US , Australia and other countries. 
A key issue addressed in many of these studies is that voluntary self-selection by the farmer 
participants adversely affects scheme efficiency and cost-effectiveness, because those most likely to 
join the scheme contribute least to the scheme objectives, referred to as ‘adverse selection’. This is 
regarded as a particular problem where payment levels are related to average participation costs for 
a given group of participants since the probability of participating for profit maximising producers is 
negatively correlated with the opportunity costs of participation and thus with agricultural 
productivity.  This is a key result in the Quillerou and Fraser study of the UK Higher Level 
Stewardship scheme and they go on to show that the impact of this is reduced to some extent by 
certain features of scheme implementation.    
It has also been suggested that farmers with lower productivity land generate a higher level 
of ecological services. This is because the land is farmed less intensively and there is less damage to 
ecological resources.  Numerous studies confirm this in a European context, including Kleijn et al. 
(2009), Tscharantke et al. (2005), Reidsma et al. (2006) and Stoate et al. (2001).  The Kleijn et al. 
paper also points out that conservation benefits are disproportionately less costly to achieve on low-
intensity farms.  Taken together these relationships imply that participation will be biased towards 
farmers with lower participation costs and thus towards farmers that generate higher levels of 
ecological services.  This would support the idea that these schemes would tend to be characterised 
not by ‘adverse selection’ but by an opposite phenomenon that might be described as ‘beneficial 
selection’. However, while this will reduce the costs of dealing with asymmetric information, it will 
not totally eliminate these costs, as noted below. 
This paper will investigate participation by farmers in the UK Environmental Stewardship 
Scheme (ESS) and how decisions to join the scheme are related to farming intensity levels on the one 
hand and conservation benefits on the other.  In particular the paper will explore the extent to 
which the self selection of farmers onto the scheme influences likely scheme performance.   A two-
part analysis is envisaged here.  The first part of the paper analyses a theoretical model for the 
provision of ecological services with farmers under contract to a government agency.  The results of 
this analysis are used to motivate the empirical investigation of a sample of participants in the UK’s 
Environmental Stewardship Schemes.  
We use a unique panel dataset on different ESS agreements for different years and for the 
whole of the UK including characteristics on conservation options chosen and payments received. 4 
 
We link this data to environmental and spatial characteristics of the land under agreement as well as 
production and socioeconomic characteristics of the participating farms via GIS mapping tools and 
different matching techniques. The empirical analysis is based on different regression models 
addressing problems of selection bias and endogeneity with respect to the different spatial and 
agreement related characteristics. A dynamic panel estimator is applied to account for lagged 
behavioural responses with respect to the farmers’ participation and the individual contract decision 
(i.e. timing and individual options chosen). The results will deliver valuable empirical evidence on the 
nature and degree of the above outlined theoretical relationships and will crucially inform policy 
makers on a more adequate design of conservation schemes. 
In section 2 we analyses a simple model self-selection under asymmetric information focusing in 
particular on the different assumptions and implications between adverse and beneficial selection.  
In section 3 we describe an empirical model and analysis used to test a number of the key underlying 
assumptions for this model.  Section 4 presents a summary and some tentative conclusions of our 
preliminary analyses. 
 
2.  A model of Self-selection under Asymmetric information 
The impairment of market efficiency when information is imperfect and asymmetric was first noted 
by economists in the analysis of markets for insurance (e.g. Anderson, 1956).  Setting premium 
payments at a level that covered expected payouts inevitably meant that only those who presented 
a higher level of risk than average choose to take up the policies ensuring losses for the insurance 
company.  Those with lower risk always declined to take on the insurance policy leading to complete 
collapse of the market even when there were willing buyers and sellers who could both gain from 
participating in the market.  This problem was labelled ‘adverse selection’ in the early papers 
including those by Arrow (1963) and Akerlof (1970), borrowing a term previously in widespread use 
in the insurance industry and actuarial science (Arrow, 2009).  It was also demonstrated that this 
problem was a feature of many other markets besides that for insurance. 
The benchmark scenario involves a market for a good or service where one of the parties 
(e.g. the buyer of used cars in Akerlof’s example) has less information about the quality and/or value 
of what they are buying than the seller.  More specifically, the buyer knows that quality varies 
between sellers and has information about the average quality of the goods on the market.  The 
buyer also knows that the seller has full information about the quality of the particular item that 
they are offering for sale.  The problem with this market as in the insurance example above is that 
for any offer price made by the buyer, only items valued at or below this price will be offered for sale, 
so the buyer will most likely lose out in the transaction.  This is because the buyer has no way of 5 
 
determining the quality of the item before purchase and so is likely to purchase an item that is worth 
less than the price being offered.  This is a view of the adverse selection problem where the 
incentives are structured so that there is over-representation of low quality goods on the market.  As 
in the case of insurance we can construct an example where the uninformed party (the buyer in this 
case) will want to progressively change the offer price to the point where the market disappears so 
that no items are being traded.    This will be the case even when there are some potential trades 
between willing buyers and sellers because asymmetric information and adverse selection mean 
that potential trading partners cannot identify each other.  As a result some potential gains from 
trade remain unexploited and market efficiency is reduced. 
A simple model of this type of situation (adapted from Kreps,1990) can be applied in the 
context of Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) schemes where an agency sets out to conclude 
contracts with individual farmers for the provision of ecosystem services.  The agency offers a 
payment per hectare of land committed to the scheme on condition that the farmer undertakes 
specified activities on this land to enhance the agro-ecosystem and deliver higher levels of non-
marketable ecosystem services.  These activities will involve modification to ongoing farming 
practices resulting in increased costs and reduced profits from the farming operation. 
In these circumstances we may assume that the ecological quality and thus the capability for 
generating ecosystem services on land committed to the scheme is private information to the 
farmer.  The agency knows only average ecological quality across a group of farmers.  We assume 
that land falls into distinct quality categories e
1... e
N, giving average quality      
∑          
∑        
, where     
is hectares committed to the scheme of land of quality n and p is the agency’s payment per hectare.  
We assume an upward sloping farmer participation function           ;   
   
     0 and an agency 
contract demand function that depends on payment and average quality,        ,    ; 
  
      0,
  
       0. The slope of this function is given by 
  
    
  
     
  
     
     
   and will depend on the sign of 
    
  .  
Since we have assumed that the first term on the right of this expression is negative while the 
second is positive, this means that if the third term is positive (average ecological quality increases 
with contract payment) then the slope of the contract demand curve could be positive (i.e. 
backward bending) for some payment levels.   
As illustrated in Figure 1, there are three possible outcomes here for a given contract 
demand curve and different positively sloped participation curves.  These outcomes range from a 
single unique equilibrium labelled ‘a’, through multiple equilibria labelled ‘b1’ and ‘b2’, to the 
absence of any trading equilibrium with participation curve ‘C’.  Only this latter outcome represents 6 
 
the case of ‘adverse selection’ described in the used car market (Akerlof, 1970), and in markets for 
insurance (Arrow, 1963 and many others). 
This means that there is a need to distinguish between two separate impacts of asymmetric 
information on market efficiency.  The direct impact has been addressed in this model, arising from 
the relationship between quality of supply and market price and focusing on the potential failure to 
match potential buyers with willing sellers and the consequential loss of potential gains from trade.  
This deadweight loss will impact on both farmers and the contracting agency.  However there is a 
second indirect impact on market efficiency arising from the need for the uninformed party (in the 
examples quoted above, seller of insurance policies, buyer of used cars, or contracting agency for 
ecosystem services) to pay information rents in order to achieve the best possible market 
equilibrium.  This involves a trade-off between rent and efficiency and will likely result in additional 
deadweight efficiency losses. 
However because of the special characteristics of PES schemes we can show that 
    
   must be 
negative (average ecological quality declines as contract payment increases), in contrast to the 
examples of used cars or insurance policies.  As discussed in Appendix A, the key assumption here is 
a negative relationship at agreement level between ecological quality and scheme payments 
(
   
     0).  This means that the contract demand curve for hectares committed to PES schemes 
must be downward sloping, so that self selection of famers onto this scheme cannot result in 
adverse selection and could represent an opposite phenomenon that can be referred to as 
‘beneficial selection’.  In this situation PES contracts will not be subject to the type of direct 
efficiency losses discussed in the previous paragraph.  On the other hand, indirect efficiency losses 
may be reduced but probably not to zero.  The empirical analysis in the next section of this paper is 
focused only on the direct efficiency losses.  The potential impact of beneficial selection on the 
indirect losses arising through the rent-efficiency trade-off is the subject of ongoing investigation by 
the authors. 
 
3.  Data, Empirical Model and Results   
We use a comprehensive dataset consisting of different cross-sections over 5 years (2005 to 2009). It 
consists of individual ESS agreements for the whole of the UK including characteristics on 
conservation options chosen and payments received. We link this data to environmental and spatial 
characteristics of the land under agreement as well as production and socioeconomic characteristics 
of the participating farms using GIS mapping tools and matching techniques. The empirical analysis 
at this stage is based on simple cross-sectional regression models estimated by a standard OLS 
technique. As our sample consists of the full population of agreements in these years selectivity bias 7 
 
is not relevant here. The results will deliver valuable empirical evidence on the nature and degree of 
the above outlined theoretical relationships and will crucially inform policy makers on a more 
adequate design of conservation schemes.   
Rather than estimate a complete demand system for ecological services the empirical 
analysis in this paper is based around the notion that the key relationships define a reduced form 
that can be represented by an implicit function    , , …..     , where e is ecological quality, p is 
scheme payment and h is land committed to the scheme.  The parameters of this relationship can be 
estimated by setting any convenient variable as dependent variable in the regression and 
subsequently estimating the relevant marginal impacts based on the Implicit Function Rule (see 
Chiang, 1984). By this mathematical specification of the functional form of the estimation model we 
account for likely endogeneity with respect to some of the variables used. The empirical proxies for 
these variables and their average values across the sample data are given in Table 1.  The results of 
the regressions are presented in Table 2 while the estimated marginal impacts are presented in 
Table 3. 
These latter estimates confirm that for the agreements considered in this study, ecological 
quality of land committed to the scheme is negatively related to scheme payments i.e. 
   
     0.  As 
argued in Section 2 above (and in Appendix A) this means that  
    
     0, and the agency’s contract 
demand curve must be downward sloping at all levels of payment.  The results also confirm that 
scheme payments increase as farming intensity increases.  Thus we can conclude that self selection 
by farmers on to the UK ESS schemes will not undermine the possibility of market equilibrium which 
would lead to a direct loss of potential gains from trade that this type of adverse selection would 
entail. 
 
4.  Summary and Conclusions 
This study explores the possibility that adverse selection (as originally understood in the analysis of 
insurance markets and in early papers on the economics of asymmetric information) will not arise as 
a result of farmers’ decision to participate in UK ESS schemes.  A simple model that recognises the 
inherent asymmetry of information in these decisions, considers a situation where an agency sets 
out to conclude contracts with individual farmers for the provision of ecosystem services.  In these 
circumstances we assume that the ecological quality and thus the capability for generating 
ecosystem services on land committed to the scheme is private information to the farmer.  The 
agency knows only average ecological quality across a group of farmers.  Algebraic and graphical 
analysis reveals the possibility of two separate impacts that could result in loss of efficiency.  8 
 
A direct impact could result in a complete breakdown in the system of contracts for 
ecosystem services where asymmetric information means that neither the agency nor the farmer 
can identify feasible transactions.  No equilibrium is achievable and there is a deadweight loss of 
potential gains from trade; this is the classic example of adverse selection and is specifically 
considered in this study.  We show that, because of the special characteristics of PES schemes, this 
impact will not arise in Environmental Stewardship Schemes in the UK.  However, even where a set 
of equilibrium contracts can be concluded (as is typically the case in PES schemes) there is still an 
indirect loss of efficiency due to asymmetric information, as the agency pays information rents to 
some farmers in order to improve the allocative efficiency of the overall set of contracts. This rent-
efficiency trade-off is being considered by the authors in a separate study. 
Data for the empirical analysis refers to individual agreements concluded by farmers 
participating in the UK’s Environmental Stewardship Schemes and includes information on 
characteristics of the farmer and of the farming operation for over 10,000 scheme participants.   
Results from the regression analysis confirm that classic adverse selection is not possible 
ruling out a direct loss of efficiency. While this has clear advantages from a policy perspective it does 
not guarantee efficient contracting in PES schemes.  However it raises interesting issues about 
potential interactions between the direct and indirect impacts outlined in the previous paragraph.  
In particular it raises questions about whether the presence of beneficial selection the fact that it 
guarantees an equilibrium set of contracts will affect the rent-efficiency trade-off, for example by 
reducing the amount of information rents demanded and/or by reducing the efficiency impacts of 
taking steps to reduce these rents.  This may point to ways in which policy makers can improve the 
design of PES contracts. 
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Appendix A: Scheme payments and average ecological quality 
In the model discussed in Section 2 above, the nature of the demand function for land committed to a 
PES scheme depends crucially on the relationship between the average ecological quality (  ) of this land and 
the level of scheme payments (p). 
Given     
∑          
∑        
 we determine that  
    
     
 ∑
   
      ∑      
        ∑    ∑      ∑
   
        
 ∑         . 
This simplifies to 
     
     
 ∑
   
         ∑      ∑
   
             ∑      ∑
   
      
 ∑           
 ∑
   
        
    
 ∑         .  The sign of this expression 
depends on the sign of 
   
    since all other terms are positive.  This term represents the relationship between 
the ecological quality of an individual parcel of land and the level of scheme payments available for this land. 
We argue here that this term must be negative because of the special characteristics of PES schemes in the UK.   
When payments to farmers are designed to cover the opportunity cost to farmers of participating in 
the scheme it is likely that payment levels will increase for farmers on land that is farmed more intensively.  It 
has also been shown (Kleijn et al., 2009) that ecological quality declines as land use intensity increases. Taken 
together these imply a negative relationship between ecological quality and scheme payments for an 
individual parcel of land.  Given the analysis above this implies a negative relationship between average 






Figure 1.  Self selection and market efficiency under asymmetric information 
Note: D illustrates a backward bending contract demand curve (i.e. positively sloped at some price levels).  Three positively sloped 
farmer participation curves, representing alternative sets of circumstances, are illustrated by A, B and C. With A there is a single 















Table 1.  Description of the Sample Data 
Variable  Empirical Proxy: Description 




Minimum  Maximum 
h   Agreement Hectares  [ha under agreement]  143.49  229.21  0.34  7027.16 
P  Scheme Payments [GBP per agreement]  39188.5  99959.3  54.0  2.72e+06 
i  Intensity of Production [Variable Cost per ha at JCA Level]  1361.83  2901.85  190.42  193402.0 
e  Inverse of Intensity [Variable Cost per ha at JCA Level 
-1]  1.87e-03  1.19e-03  1.89e-05  1.41e-02 
Year  Year of Agreement Start  2006.12  1.10  2005  2009 
GOR1  Government Office Region 1  0.114  0.318  0  1 
GOR2  Government Office Region 2  0.105  0.306  0  1 
GOR3  Government Office Region 3  0.002  0.045  0  1 
GOR4  Government Office Region 4  0.026  0.158  0  1 
GOR5  Government Office Region 5  0.181  0.385  0  1 
GOR6  Government Office Region 6  0.076  0.265  0  1 
GOR7  Government Office Region 7  0.189  0.392  0  1 
GOR8  Government Office Region 8  0.191  0.393  0  1 
Age  Age of Average Farmer in JCA [Years]  52.985  3.379  39.5  68.5 
Size  Size of Average Farm in JCA [FBS Size Code]  3.957  0.459  1.5  6 
Edu 
Level of Education of Average Farmer in JCA [0-School 
Only, 1-GSCE, 2-A Level, 3-Diploma, 4-Degree, 5-PG, 6-
Apprenticeship, 9-Other] 
2.145  0.669  0  4.5 
Gender  Gender of Average Farmer in JCA [1-Male, 2-Female]  1.034  0.054  1  1.333 
Off-farm 
Off-Farm Income of Average Farmer in JCA [GBP per Farm 
and Year] 
8819.93  4112.77  0  49875.0 
Tcereal  Mainly Cereal Producing Farm (FBS Robust Type 1)  0.018  0.156  0  1 
Tcrop  Mainly Crops Producing Farm (FBS Robust Type 2)  0.096  0.294  0  1 
Thorti  Mainly Horticulture Farm (FBS Robust Type 3)  0.156  0.363  0  1 
Tpig  Mainly Pigs Producing Farm (FBS Robust Type 4)  0.209  0.406  0  1 
Tpoult  Mainly Poultry Producing Farm (FBS Robust Type 5)  0.241  0.428  0  1 
Tdairy  Mainly Dairy Producing Farm (FBS Robust Type 6)  0.226  0.418  0  1 
Tlfagr  Mainly LFA Grazing Farm (FBS Robust Type 7)  0.054  0.226  0  1 





Table 2.  Results of the Regressions Analysis 
Variable  Coefficient  SE  Variable  Coefficient  SE 
B  0.023***  3.04e-04  b
2  1.594e-07***  3.98e-09 
P  0.001***  2.22e-05  p
2  1.01e-08***  1.51e-11 
i  -0.001  2.17e-03  i
2  1.89e-08  4.48e-08 
Bp  -3.84e-08***  6.04e-10  bi  1.95e-06***  2.64e-07 
Pi  -4.39e-07***  1.81e-08  year  -0.034**  0.016 
gor1  -8.428***  3.165  gor2  2.378  3.810 
gor3  -11.337  19.169  gor4  8.462*  5.601 
gor5  1.607  2.733  gor6  -17.154***  3.781 
gor7  -22.991***  2.585  age  0.199  0.283 
Size  5.482***  2.067  edu  -3.929***  1.539 
Gender  30.092*  16.878  offfarm  -2.713-05  2.28e-04 
Tcereal  19.055  15.209  tcrop  22.612  19.001 
Thorti  18.988  18.989  tpig  20.102  19.046 
Tpoult  15.837  19.072  tdairy  27.923  19.075 
Tlfagr  17.981  19.336  tlowgr  -8.057  26.109 
Model Diagnostics 
N  10,951  AdjR
2  0.849 
F-test  2122.70*** [29,10,921]  LR-test (b=0)  75052.83*** 




Table 3.  Estimated Marginal Effects 




    
  
  -4.113e-07***  1.379e-07 
  
  
  15.407***  5.079 
 
 